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FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS:
SCHOLARLY RESEARCH AND COPYRIGHT CASE
LAW SINCE 1992
I. INTRODUCTION

Copyright law in the United States grants authors exclusive rights to reproduce,
adapt, distribute, perform, and display their works.' These exclusive rights constitute
a monopoly, in effect, but it is a limited monopoly inasmuch as it is qualified in three
important ways. First, works enjoy copyright protection for a prescribed period of
time2 -currently, the author's life plus fifty years 3 -at the expiration of which they
fall into the public domain and may be freely copied by anyone, without fear of
infringement. Second, copyright protects only original expression, not ideas or
information. 4 Third, the doctrine of fair use as it has been codified in § 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act") permits users other than the copyright owner to
copy protected expression without the owner's consent, if such copying is done in a
reasonable manner and for a legitimate purpose.5
These three checks placed upon the copyright monopoly-the first an absolute
temporal limitation, the second a conceptual limitation grounded in the idea/
expression dichotomy, 6 the third a flexible privilege in the user-serve the same social
and pragmatic goal as the monopoly itself: "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." 7 While exclusive copyright provides authors with an economic incentive
to create new works, the fair use privilege permits reasonable copying of those works

in the interests of generating still more new works. 8 In this respect, Anglo-American

I. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
8 ("The Congress shall have power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
2. See U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8,cl.
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.").
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). Congress has recently extended the present copyright term by twenty years to
the author's life plus seventy years. See Sonny Bono Copy Right Term Extension Act, S.505 105th Cong. (1997)
reprintedin CONG. REc. H9946-9954 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998).
4. See id. § 102(b). In his dissent in Harper &Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539,589

(1985), Justice Brennan noted that "[a] subsequent author's taking of information and ideas is in no sense piratical
because copyright law simply does not create any property interest in information and ideas." For the statutory meaning
of "originality," see I MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 [A], at 2-9 (1998)
("Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently created,
and not copied from other works."). See also I PAUL GOLDStEIN, COPYR[rGH. PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE §
1.2.2.3, at 14-16 (1989) (discussing the meaning of "originality" in copyright law).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
6. For a succinct discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy (or distinction), see I GOLDSTEIN, supranote 4,§
1.2.2.4, at 16 ("Copyright law withholds protection from ideas on the principle that the national culture would languish
if creators had to pay tribute each time they employed one of these building blocks.").
8.
7. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
8. The goal of encouraging the composition of useful books by "allowing a second author to use, under certain
conditions, a portion of a prior author's work" formed a consistent theme in early British fair use cases. WiLLIAM F.
1, at
PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE INCOPYRIGHT LAW 5 (2d ed. 1995). See also 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, § 1.
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copyright jurisprudence envisions a kind of creative ecosystem in which rights,
privileges, and incentives coexist and works beget works. 9
The doctrine of fair use has a twofold function in our society. Its initial purpose

is a supralegal one: to foster a climate of understanding in which authors, copyright
owners, and users of protected expression recognize their respective rights and
responsibilities and, ideally, work together to promote tolerance and creative
progress.' ° When that understanding breaks down and a dispute results in litigation,
fair use realizes its second purpose as an affirmative defense" to a claim of copyright
infringement. As such, it allows a defendant to acknowledge the act of copying
protected expression but to raise affirmatively certain facts that justify the
copying-notably the transformative character of the new work. A new work is
considered to be transformative when it does more than merely offer itself as a

substitute for the original and "instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."' 2
If a work transforms material taken from its source, it is likely to add in an innovative
way to our culture's store of knowledge and to promote the progress of enlightenment
envisaged in the Constitution's Copyright Clause.'3

The 1976 Act offers a nonexclusive list ofpurposes that may qualify for the fair
use privilege--"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...

scholarship, or

research"' 4 -and establishes four nonexclusive factors that are to be used by courts
in testing for fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used; (4) the effect

6 ("The balance that copyright law strikes between the incentives that authors and publishers need to produce original
works and the freedom that they and others need to draw on earlier copyrighted works rests on a judgment about social
benefit.").
9. By the copyright "ecosystem" I refer to the fundamental Anglo-American conception ofcopyright as a utilitarian
overlapping ofrights rather than a mine-thine property ideal. Professor Weinreb disagrees with Judge Leval and others
who see fair use in instrumental terms-that is, as "a utilitarian limitation on thegeneral utilitarian purpose ofthe [ 1976
Copyright] Act"--and places fair use in the context of broader conceptions of "fairness." Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's
Fair:A Comment on the FairUse Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1150-51 (1990).
10. The attempt in this comment to conceptualize fair use in terms of a larger "supralegal" role in society-a role
that transcends the specifically legal functions of the doctrine-may be compared to Professor Fisher's notion of fair
use as contributing to "the good life": "uses of copyrighted material that either constitute or facilitate creative
engagement with intellectual products should be preferred to uses that neither constitute nor foster such engagement."
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructingthe FairUse Doctrine, 101 HAv. L. REV. 1661, 1768 (1988).
11. See 4 NiIMEi, supra note 4,§ 13.05, at 13-149.
12. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Campbell Court took the term
"transformative use" from Pierre N. Leval's article, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990) ("Transformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original author,
proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it. They also may include
parody, symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses."). See also Leval, NimmerLecture:Fair Use
Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1449, 1466 (stating that Campbell"revives the transformative-superseding dichotomy as
the dominant consideration" and "reinstates fair use as an integral and essential part of copyright necessary to ... the
encouragement of learning and the 'Progress of Science"). The notion of fair use as transformative is not a product
of recent times. Patry's useful survey of the early English cases involving fair use and fair abridgment (1740-1839)
shows that courts from the beginning inquired as to whether a defendant had made productive, creative use of the
plaintiff's work, as opposed to merely copying it. See PATRY, supranote 8, at 6-18.
13. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I. § 8, cl.
8.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.' This comment
focuses on the first two factors as they relate to scholarly fair use of unpublished
works, an area of copyright law that has been intensely debated in recent years. Part
II of this comment discusses the 1976 Act's codification of the earlier common-law
copyright in unpublished works. Part HI reviews the pivotal court decisions of the
1980s and early 1990s that threatened to discourage scholars and researchers from
making any use, fair or foul, of unpublished materials and that led Congress in 1992
to amend the 1976 Act to underscore the continued vitality of fair use of unpublished
works.
The great question since 1992 has been whether the amendment will succeed in
removing the chill from legitimate use of such works, and whether courts will be more
flexible in testing the merits of fair use defenses in this context. Although relevant
decisions since 1992 have not been numerous, there are distinctly favorable signs that
courts are acquiring a new sensitivity to the fair use needs of scholars. Accordingly,
Part IV of this comment surveys post-1992 decisions that have involved the question
of fair use of unpublished works.
The conclusion addresses the scholar's predicament in the 1990s when the
hostility and vigilance of literary estates remain an obstacle to the dissemination of
serious research, and the reluctance of many publishers and editors to stand behind
their authors' fair use privilege threatens to neutralize the beneficial changes wrought
by recent decisional law. This comment concludes by arguing that, while the present
judicial trend is a constructive one which ought to be encouraged, it must be
supplemented by fair use advocacy on the part of publishers, editors, authors,
librarians, and others who are intimately involved in the transformative uses that have
historically justified the fair use privilege. To put it another way, the supralegal
culture, no less than the legal one, must play its part in sustaining the vitality of fair
use.
As the 1992 amendment serves to remind us, and as courts are now
acknowledging, unpublished works form a rich part of our cultural heritage and must
yield, within the constraints imposed by a limited monopoly, to the larger needs of
society. If these works continue to be viewed solely in their character of private
property, they will be prevented from participating fully in the creative ecosystem that
generates new embodiments of expression, and the practical ends of Anglo-American
copyright law will to that extent be frustrated. The immediate sufferers will be
historians, biographers, scholars, and journalists; the ultimate victim will be society
itself.
II. FROM COMMON LAW TO CODE: THE 1976 AcT
Prior to implementation of the 1976 Act, unpublished works enjoyed perpetual
common-law copyright protection: the owner's right to exclude all others from the

15. See id.
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work.' 6 The price paid by an author, her heirs, or assignees for such exclusive
control was renunciation of economic benefit and acceptance of the work's
obscurity, 7 for common-law protection lasted just so long as the copyright owner
chose to withhold the work from publication.'" Perpetual copyright meant perpetual
eschewal of the public sphere. Under the Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act"),' 9
which was the predecessor of the 1976 Act, the act of publication with notice
conferred federal statutory copyright on a work.2" When the work passed from the
locked drawer to the bookstore shelf, and once the formalities of notice, registration,
and deposit 2' had been observed,
common-law copyright was extinguished and
22
statutory copyright began.
Under the 1909 Act, statutory copyright afforded protection for a maximum of
fifty-six years from the date of first publication.'

The copyright owner exchanged

her perpetual common-law rights for a limited monopoly, a monopoly qualified by
an absolute temporal limitation, on the one hand, and by judicially-applied fair use,

on the other. As long as a work remained unpublished, however, no unauthorized use

16. See 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (amended 1976, effective Jan. 1,1978). The 1909 Act originated as Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075, (amended by Act ofJuly 30, 1947, ch. 391,61 Stat. 652, amended Oct. 19, 1976, as Pub.
L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, effective Jan. 1, 1978). Prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act, copyright protection
was administered through a dual system of jurisprudence, with federal courts deciding those cases that fell under
statutory law and state courts deciding those that came under the common-law rule regarding unpublished works. The
1976 Act abolished the dual system and placed copyright works, published and unpublished, under federal protection.
See PARRY, supra note 8, at 132-33, 534-36; 1 NIMMER, supranote 4, § 2.02, at 2-18 to 2-19.
17. Goldstein characterizes the author's choice between "divestitive publication" under the 1909 Act and perpetual
common-law protection as "a bargain between author and society: An author could enjoy perpetual protection for her
work so long as she did not seek economic rewards through the work's dissemination." I GOLDSTEIN, supranote 4,
§ 3.2.2., at 236-37. Goldstein also discusses thejudicially-recognized exception to divestitive publication, whereby the
copyright owner permitted distribution of copies of a work to a limited class of persons for a limited purpose. In such
a case, the copyright owner had not surrendered control over further production of copies. See id. at 240.
18. The right ofexclusive control over an unpublished work was grounded squarely on the author's time-honored
common-law right of first publication, a right recognized by British courts in the earliest cases. See, e.g., Millar v.
Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769); Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774) (discussed in PATRY, supra note
8, at 4-5, 531 & n.622.) The right of first publication continues to be a potent consideration in our own time. The 1976
Act effectively embodied this right in the copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute copies of the copyright work.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (making that work subject, like all
exclusive rights granted to authors under § 106, to the fair
use provisions of § 107). See also I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, § 1.6.3, at 33; 4 NIMMER, supra note 4, §
13.05[A][2][b], at 13-179 n.172 ("[T]he right of first publication under Section 106 by its terms is limited by the right
offair use under Section 107; accordingly, there can be no categorical presumption against fair use for the Section 106
right of first publication."). The denial of the fair use defense to The Nation in its dispute with Harper & Row turned
on the Supreme Court's conclusion that, in scooping Time magazine's planned publication of former President Ford's
unpublished memoirs, The Nation had "effectively arrogated to itself the right of first publication, an important
marketable subsidiary right." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,549 (1985). See
also PARY, supra note 8, at 135-37, 543-44 (discussing the ruling on right of first publication in Harper&Row).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (amended 1976, effective Jan. 1, 1978).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (amended 1976, effective Jan. 1, 1978). An exception existed under § 12 of the
1909 Act whereby statutory copyright could be acquired in certain types of unpublished works-that is, works not
reproduced for sale or distribution-by means of deposit, with claim of copyright, of one complete copy of the work
in the Copyright Office. See LEONH.AMDUR, COPYRIGrTLAWANDPRACTIcE 439 (1936) (discussing the meaning and
application of§ 12 of the 1909 Act).
21. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 10- 13,19 (1976) (amended 1976, effective Jan. 1,1978).
22. See I NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.02, at 2-19, and § 4.01, at 4-3.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (amended 1976, effective Jan. 1, 1978).
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Fair use simply did not exist for unpublished works; the

doctrine entered the picture only when publication set the statutory machinery in
motion. 25
Fair use wasnot codified in the 1909 Act, but rather remained essentially what
it had been since its inception in the English common law: an equitable doctrine, or
rule of reason,2 6 which courts applied on a flexible case-by-case basis in suits

involving infringement. Prior to the 1976 Act, fair use was not a defense to an action
for infringement of an unpublished work, since the exclusive common-law monopoly

in such a work prevented that defense from arising in litigation. 27 But the 1976 Act
changed all that. Not only did it codify the fair use doctrine; 28 it also brought

unpublished works within its statutory scheme by abolishing the common-law
distinction between published and unpublished works.2 9
The 1976 Act created this unified system by shifting the beginning of copyright

protection from the act of publication to the moment of fixation in a "tangible
medium of expression."3' Under this scheme, once a work has acquired a final form

and become "fixed" in some tangible medium, the copyright clock begins to tick and
continues ticking for fifty years after the author has died.31 With this momentous
reconceptualization of copyright genesis, the legal distinction between the locked

drawer and the bookstore shelf disappeared, for in either locus, public or private, a
work enjoyed the benefits of statutory protection.32

But were unpublished works subject to the newly codified fair use provision?
The question does not admit of a simple answer. William F. Patry, the noted fair use

commentator, argues that "Congress intended to continue the common law prohibition

24. Discussing theAmerican inheritanceofBritish copyrightprinciples,Patry notes: "Thedivisionbetween common
law and statutory copyright protection and the unavailability of fair use for unpublished works was continued in the
United States." PARY, supra note 8, at 534.
25. See Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73,78 (Cal. 1950) ("The common law prohibits any kind of
unauthorized interference with, or use of, an unpublished work on the ground of an exclusive property right... while
a statutory copyright permits a 'fair use' of the copyright publication, without deeming it an infringement.").
26. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,448 (1984) (stating that fair use is an "equitable
rule of reason"); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that "[tihe
doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition"). Patry takes issue with these judicial
characterizations of fair use as an equitable rule of reason, pointing out that many of the early fair use cases were
brought at law. "It is therefore incorrect to characterize fair use as a child of equity." PATRY, supra note 8, at 5.
27. See PHIUPWrrrENBERG, THE PROTECONOF LrrERARY PROPERTY 125 (1968) ("Before publication there can
be no fair use of works protected under common-law copyright.").
28. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.05, at 13-149 to 13-152; 2 GOLDSTIN, supra note 4, § 10.1, at 188.
29. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 104(a), 30 1(a)
(1994). The statute also establishes special durational terms for works created
but not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act. See id. § 303.
30. See id. §§ 101, 102(a). Nimmer notes that fixation in a tangible medium is both a "statutory condition to
copyright" and a "constitutional necessity," since "unless a work is reduced to tangible form it cannot be regarded as
a 'writing' within the meaning ofthe constitutional clause authorizing federal copyright legislation." I NIMMER, supra
note 4, § 2.03[B], at 2-30.2 to 2-30.3.
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). But see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
32. See I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, § 3.3, at 254 ("The 1976 Copyright Act substantially preempted common law
copyright, thus virtually eliminating any role for divestitive publication [that is, publication that divested a copyright
owner of its common-law copyright]. Because the Act made statutory protection attach upon a work's fixation in a copy
or phonorecord, it also substantially reduced the role of investitive publication [publication that, if made with the
statutorily required notice, invested the work with statutory copyright].").
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against fair use of unpublished but not voluntarily disseminated works." 3 Others
believe that the drafters of the 1976 Act contemplated at least a narrow applicability
of fair use to unpublished works. 4 Whether fair use and unpublished works, kept
asunder by the common law, would be allowed to confront each other in the statutory
arena was, as it turned out, a question that the courts would have to answer. With
the enactment of the 1976 Act, a limited monopoly had come to unpublished works,
but did those limitations include fair use? The progress of scholarship might well
depend on the answer to that question.35
III. THE BIG CHILL: HARPER &ROWAND ITS PROGENY

Although the 1976 Act guaranteed published and unpublished works equal
protection under statutory law, the courts quickly showed themselves reluctant to
recognize that equality where fair use was concerned. In 1977, Harper & Row
acquired publishing rights to former President Gerald Ford's memoirs.36 Two years
later, the firm, as the copyright holder, granted Time magazine a prepublication
license to print an excerpt from Ford's account of his pardon of former President
Richard Nixon.3 7 Shortly before the Time article was scheduled to appear, however,
an editor of The Nation obtained an unauthorized copy of Ford's manuscript and
scooped Time by publishing in The Nation an article containing verbatim quotations
from the manuscript.3 As a consequence, Time aborted its plan to publish the article
and refused to pay Harper & Row the balance under the licensing agreement.39 In the
copyright infringement suit that followed, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York ruled in favor of Harper & Row, but the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that The Nation's scoop was a fair use of the
copyrighted though as yet unpublished manuscript.' ° The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit."
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion pointed to the unpublished nature of Ford's
memoirs as a "'key, though not necessarily determinative, factor' tending to negate
a defense of fair use,"'42 and placed particular emphasis on the author's "right to

33. PATRY, supra note 8, at 535. Among relevant legislative history materials is the following passage: "The
applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavailable,
this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances the copyright

owner's 'right of first publication' would outweigh any needs of reproduction ..

" PATRY, supra note 8, at 134 &

n.163 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 64 (1975)).
34. That § 107 of the 1976 Act "does not distinguish between the fair use of published and unpublished works..
is evidence that fair use may be applicable to unpublished works." James Adkins, Note, FairUse and Unpublished
Works: Public Law 102-492-An Amendment to the FairUse Statute, 38 ST. Loins U. LJ. 231,236 (1993-94).

35. Certain scholarly groups, such as the American Historical Association, played an active role in Congressional
deliberations leading up to the 1976 Act. See PATRY, supranote 8, at 537-41.
36. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,542 (1985).

37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
See id. at 542-43.
See id. at 543.
See id. at 542.

41. See id.
42. Harper&Row, 471 U.S. at 554 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 64 (1975)).
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control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression."'43 In this case,
the second fair use factor-the nature of the protected work-weighed heavily in
favor of the petitioners, Harper & Row. The work's unpublished nature along with
the copyright holder's corresponding right of first publication persuaded the majority
that "the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works."' In a
strong and lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan argued that The Nation's scooping of
Time was noninfringing in that its article was based in large part on unprotected
information and ideas, and that its quotation of 300 words from a 200,000-word
manuscript was minimal and justified by the purpose of news reporting. He
concluded that the majority Court "adopted an exceedingly narrow view of fair use
in order to impose liability for what was in essence a taking of unprotected
information."45
The dramatic facts of Harper& Row make it something of an anomaly among
cases involving the question of fair use of unpublished works. The Nation's
aggressive scooping of its competitor and the costly collapse of Time's licensing
agreement with Harper & Row virtually guaranteed a reversal of the Second Circuit.
Judicial chivalry would not permit the Supreme Court to give assistance to a
journalistic predator hiding behind a defense of fair use, whatever the merits of that
defense. Harper& Row's atypicality made it a particularly unfortunate precedent for
scholars, biographers, and historians, whose use of unpublished materials is usually
much less aggressive and piratical than was The Nation's. The fear expressed in
Justice Brennan's dissent that the Court was introducing "a categorical presumption
against prepublication fair use ' " was realized two years later in Salingerv. Random
House, Inc., where the Second Circuit, its wrist still smarting from the slap
administered in Harper & Row, reversed the lower court's denial of a preliminary
injunction to author J.D. Salinger.47
The famously reclusive Salinger sought a preliminary injunction restraining
Random House from distributing Ian Hamilton's unauthorized account of his life.'
Hamilton, a serious and well-known writer, had drawn heavily upon unpublished
letters by Salinger which had been deposited by the recipients or their representatives
in various academic research libraries.4 9 Salinger, who had somehow received a copy
of galleys of the biography prior to its publication, demanded that the book not be
released until all quotations from unpublished letters were expunged. Hamilton
responded by substantially reducing the amount of direct quotation through rewriting
and paraphrasing.5" Salinger was not placated, however, and promptly brought suit

43. Id. at 555.
44. Id.at 564
45. Id. at 604 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

46. Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 90 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'g 650 F. Supp. 413, 417, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
48. See Salinger,811 F.2d at 92.
49. See id. at 93.
50. See id.
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in the Southern District of New York.5' Finding that the vast majority of material
used by Hamilton was information and ideas not protected by copyright,52 and that
the remaining instances of quotation or paraphrase were excused under the doctrine
of fair use,53 Judge Leval denied Salinger's application for a preliminary injunction. 4

Judge Leval held that the Supreme Court in Harper &Row "neither stated nor
implied a categorical rule barring fair use of unpublished works. 55 In his view, the
Court kept the door of fair use appreciably ajar with respect to unpublished materials.
On appeal, however, a two-judge panel of the Second Circuit seemed to slam that
door shut by holding that Harper & Row had in fact "underscored the idea that
unpublished letters normally enjoy insulation from fair use copying"56 and that "such
works normally enjoy complete protection against copying any protected
expression."57 Rejecting Judge Leval's calculus of unprotected expression in the
letters and finding instead "a very substantial appropriation" 58 of copyrighted
material, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to issue a
preliminary injunction. 59 The phrases "normally enjoy complete protection" and
"normally enjoy insulation" reflected an exaggerated interpretation of the Supreme
Court's position in Harper& Row-a marked rigidification which the vast factual
differences of the two cases did nothing to soften. With Salinger, a chilly season
commenced for scholars.
Judge Leval was not to be defeated so easily, however. One year after Salinger,
he was once again required to rule on the fair use of unpublished materials in an
unauthorized biography, this time a harsh critique of the life of L. Ron Hubbard,
founder of the Church of Scientology and the theory of Dianetics. 6' New Era
Publications International, a holder of the deceased Hubbard's copyrights, sought a
permanent injunction barring distribution by Henry Holt and Company of a second
printing of Russell Miller's biography of Hubbard, contending that the book
contained numerous infringing quotations from Hubbard's unpublished writings.6'
In a lengthy opinion, Judge Leval struggled mightily to reconcile the harsh rule
of Salingerwith the more moderate interpretation of fair use in Harper&Row. The
Second Circuit's phrase "normally enjoy complete protection" should be read with
an emphasis on "normally," he gamely suggested, for it merely pointed to "the
diminished likelihood that fair use will be found in a copying of unpublished material,

51. See id.at94.
52. See Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 418.
53. See id. at 423.
54. See id. at 428.
55. Id. at 421.
56. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95.
57. Id. at 97.
58. Id.at 98.
59. See id. at 100.
60. See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1497, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd
on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. SeeNewEra, 695 F. Supp. at 1497.
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not impossibility.. 6 "As to the [Hubbard biography] overall," he noted, "were it not
for the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Salinger,I would conclude that fair use had
been adequately demonstrated."63 But, given Salinger's"strong presumption against
a finding of fair use for unpublished materials,"' he had little choice. Concluding
that only a handful of quotations infringed New Era's copyrights and expressing
concern over free speech interests, Judge Leval denied an injunction65 and awarded
damages.6 The doctrine of first publication rights, he remarked, should not be
"perverted into the service of suppression of important critical or historical inquiry."67
When New Era appealed from the denial of injunctive relief,68 the Second
Circuit panel responded with a majority opinion that left no doubt that a high-toned
judicial brawl was in progress. While the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court, it rejected Judge Leval's rationale and concluded that laches was
"the sole bar to issuance of an injunction."69 Speedily dispensing with its affirmance,
the court proceeded to criticize Judge Leval's findings in what amounted to several
pages of reproving dictum. In particular, the Second Circuit rejected Judge Leval's
distinction between use of protected expression merely to "enliven" a text and use of
protected expression to communicate "significant points" about the subject, stating
flatly that "[w]here use is made of materials of an 'unpublished nature,' the second
fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer, and we do not do so
here."7 In stronger language than it had yet used, the Second Circuit declared that
its analysis in Salinger "creates a daunting obstacle to a fair use defense against the
use of unpublished materials. 7' The New Eracourt seemed to be moving well beyond
the case actually before it and issuing a warning to all aspiring fair users.
Perceiving the minatory quality of his colleagues' language, Chief Judge Oakes
in a concurring opinion worried that the majority's dictum "tends to cast in concrete
Salinger v. Random House"72 and gives the impression that where a copyrighted
work is unpublished, "protection follows as of course." 73 Joining Judge Leval in his
effort to recover the moderate ground of Harper& Row, Chief Judge Oakes argued
that the Supreme Court's position on fair use of unpublished works had "implicitly
renounced a per se rule."74 A few months later, in denying the prevailing party Holt's
"unprecedented" petition for a rehearing en banc occasioned by its dissatisfaction

62. Id. at 1503. In his influential article, Judge Leval reiterated his expansive interpretation ofthe Second Circuit's
use of"normally," saying that "[h]owever extreme [the court's] formulation may be, the word 'normally' suggests that

in the unusual instance fair use may be made of unpublished matter." Leval, Towarda FairUse Standard,supranote
12, at 1118.
63. New Era,695 F. Supp. at 1524.
64. Id.

65. See id. at 1528.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 1527.
Id. at 1503.
See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt and Co., 873 F.2d 576, 577-78 (2d. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 577.

70. Id. at 583.
71. Id. at582.
72. Id. at 585.

73. Id. at 587.
74. New Era PublicationsInt'l, 873 F.2d at 593.
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"with certain nondispositive language 75 in the New Era opinion, the Second Circuit
took the opportunity to back slightly away from its uncompromising position, stating
that Harper& Row "teaches that unpublished copyrighted material very rarely will
be the subject of fair use., 76 A dissent led by Judge Newman summed up the growing

climate of concern 7" by noting "the need to avoid misunderstanding on the part of
authors and publishers as to the copyright law of this Circuit-misunderstanding that
risks deterring them from entirely lawful writings in the fields of scholarly research,
biography, and journalism. 7 ' But the precedential pattern was unmistakable: Harper
& Row, Salinger,New Era. With each decision, a per se rule banning fair use of

unpublished works seemed to loom more menacingly.
In 1992, Congress responded to Salingerand New Era by amending § 107 of

the 1976 Act to add the following clarification: "The fact that a work is unpublished
shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of
all the above [fair use] factors."7' 9 The amendment's economical language drove

straight to the heart of the problem that had been developing in the case law. The
phrase "shall not itself bar" addressed the virtual per se rule against fair use of
unpublished works; the reminder that courts should consider "all of the above
factors" pointed to the importance of an equitable balancing of all the circumstances

of a given use. If, in codifying fair use, the 1976 Act had unwittingly encouraged a
rigidification of the flexible common-law doctrine-a doctrine that had been applied

by judges for nearly three centuries-then the 1992 amendment sought to restore
equitable play to the doctrine's joints.8
What the statute had unintentionally
wrought, the amended statute now strove to undo.
IV. SIGNS OF THAW INPOST-AMENDMENT CASE LAW

One year before the passage of the 1992 amendment, the Second Circuit in

75. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F.2d 659,660 (2d Cir. 1989).
76. Id.

77. In 1990, Judge Leval stated that after Salinger and New Era, "publishers [were] understandably reluctant to
pay advance royalties or to undertake commitments for biographical or historical works that call for use of [unpublished
letters]." Leval, Towarda Fair Use Standard,supranote 12, at 1107. In contrast, Patry believes that"[t]he reaction
ofsome in the publishing industry to Salingerand NewErawas hysterical," and wonders whether some of this reaction
was intended "to create a climate of fear that would then be used to justify legislation." PAihY, supranote 8,at 547-48.
78. New Era, 884 F.2d at 662 (Newman, J., dissenting). Patry notes that the Second Circuit "was obviously
polarized and the disagreements spilled out in a remarkable series of articles and congressional testimony by Judges
Leval, Miner, Newman, and Oakes." PATRY, supra note 8, at 99.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). See Leval, Nimmer Lecture:FairUse Rescued, supranote 12, at 1462 n.48 (stating
that the Act of Oct. 24, 1992, was "intended to reject the Second Circuit's reasoning in Salingerand New Era").
80. See generally S.Rep. No. 102-141, 102d Cong., at 5-6 (1991) (explaining Congress' intention in passing the
1992 amendment). "[Wie intend to roll back the virtual per se rule of Salingerand New Era, but we do not mean to
depart from Harper&Row." I NIMMER,supranote 4, § 13.05[A][2][b], at 13-177 n.202 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102141). See also 4NIMMER, supra note4, § 13.05[A][2][b], at 13-175,to § 13.05[A][3], at 13-178 (discussing the 1992
amendment and describing it as a response to the Second Circuit's "bright line rule against fair use of unpublished
excerpts"). But see PARRY, supra note 8,at 548 (describing the 1992 amendment as "a very modest amendment that
affirmsHarper&Row's treatment of unpublished works, endorses the Second Circuit's decision in Wright v. Warner
Books, does not reverse Salingeror New Era, and instead merely cautions the courts not to erect a per se rule barring
fair use based only on the unpublished nature of the work").
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Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.8" made its own effort to modify the severity of the
virtual per se rule. A dispute had arisen between author Richard Wright's widow and
Wright's biographer, Margaret Walker, over Walker's use of extensive quotations
from the author's published and unpublished writings.82 Denied permission to quote
any material, Walker rewrote portions of her manuscript to reduce her dependency
on direct quotation, and the biography was published by Warner Books in 1988.83
Ellen Wright thereupon brought an action for copyright infringement and other
claims, challenging in particular Walker's use of the author's unpublished letters and
journal entries. 4 Walker had discovered much of this material at Yale University's
Beinecke Library; other material she had drawn from letters that she herself received
from Richard Wright many years earlier.8 5 The facts sufficiently resembled those in
Salingerto make their revisitation by the New York federal courts an event that was
keenly watched by scholars and fair use advocates.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
summary judgment in favor of Walker and Warner Books and dismissed Wright's
claims.86 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court while disagreeing
with aspects of its analysis.8 7 Noting that the purpose of Walker's biography was
transformative, and that her use of the author's creative expression was
scholarly and
"sparing, 8 8 the Second Circuit found that the balance of fair use factors tipped in the
defendant's favor, even though the unpublished nature of the quoted materials
weighed for the plaintiff. The majority opinion stressed that the Second Circuit's
precedents "leave little room for discussion of this factor [nature of the copyrighted
work] once it has been determined that the copyrighted work is unpublished,"89 and
aimed a barb at the lower court for giving "insufficient weight to the unpublished
status of the letters and journal entries" in this case. 90
More significant than this rather mechanical reaffirmation of its position on
unpublished works, however, was the majority's assurance that neither Salingernor
any other case had "erected a per se rule regarding unpublished works. The fair use
test remains a totality inquiry, tailored to the particular facts of each case."' In a
judicial narrative in which dicta had come to play as large a role as actual decisions
in shaping precedent, this superficially throwaway remark added an important new
chapter to the ongoing story. Moreover, it represented an acknowledgment by the
bench that, despite the codification of fair use in the 1976 Act, the doctrine should
retain its essential common-law character as an equitable inquiry. In this respect, the
Wright opinion accorded with Congress's contemporaneous efforts to craft an
81. 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991), affg 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
82. See Wright, 953 F.2d at 734.
83. See id.

84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Wright, 748 F. Supp. at 107.
87. See Wright, 953 F.2d at 734.
88. Id. at 739.

89. Id. at 737.
90. Id.
91. Id. at740.
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amendment to § 107, and the House Committee was quick to applaud Wright for
returning to the more balanced fair use analysis of Harper &Row.92
That the New York courts seemed to be reaching an entente as to the purpose
of fair use of unpublished works did not mean that defendants in copyright
infringement actions would automatically prevail in that jurisdiction, as was made
clear in Lish v. Harper'sMagazine Foundation.93 Harper'shad printed, without
authorization, a large portion of an unpublished letter by writer and teacher, Gordon
Lish, who responded by bringing an infringement action in the Southern District of
New York.94 The court, in finding for Lish, ruled that the commercial character of
Harper'suse and the unpublished nature of the letter weighed against a fair use
defense.95 The court engaged in only perfunctory discussion of Harper's use of
unpublished material, however, and observed of the recent amendment to § 107 that,
even if it had '!retroactive application" to the instant case, "it would not produce a
different result."96 The outcome of Lish was entirely unsurprising. Harper's
unauthorized printing of the letter, which had been passed to the magazine's executive
editor by one of its freelance "stringers,"97 smacked of the piratical and recalled the
more spectacular claim-jumping in Harper &Row. Scholarly fair use would have
to await a post-amendment case with more typical facts for its vindication.
A candidate appeared inNorsev. HenryHolt and Company ("Norse I").98 This
time, the California courts would have their turn. Harold Norse, a minor Beat poet,
brought a copyright infringement action against biographer Ted Morgan and
publisher Henry Holt and Company for the unauthorized use of several phrases from
Norse's unpublished letters in Morgan's account of the life of the writer William S.
Burroughs.99 Morgan had discovered the letters at New York University's Fales
Library."0 The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on the infringement claim and other counts.'' On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit, dissatisfied with the ground on which the district court reached its decision
regarding infringement, reversed on that claim alone and remanded for a full inquiry
into the defendants' fair use defense. 2 The Ninth Circuit's charge to the lower court
was carefully worded to stress the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine as well as
its role in stimulating the very creativity that the copyright law is designed to foster.° 3
The district court took the hint admirably. Defining fair use as a doctrine that

92. See Jennifer Leman, Note, The Future of Unpublished Works in Copyright Law After the Fair Use
Amendment, 18 J. CORP. L. 619,643-44 (1993) (noting that the Senate agreed with the House that Wright had struck

the proper balance established by Harper&Row).
93. 807 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

94. See id. at 1092-93.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Seeid. at1101, 1102.
Id. at 1101 n.10.
Id. at 1093.
991 F.2d 563 (9thCir. 1993).

99. See id. at 565.
100. See id.
101. See id.

102. See id. at 568-69.
103. See id. at 566.
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"enables authors, other than the copyright owners, to reasonably use copyrighted
material without the copyright owner's consent,"' ' 4 Judge Legge proceeded to discuss
each of the four statutory factors in relation to the defendants' assertions. With
regard to the purpose of Morgan's quotations, the Norse II court pointed to the
scholarly character of the biography' 5 and distinguished Morgan's use from that of
The Nation in Harper& Row by noting that Morgan's "copying is essentially nonexploitive and the commercial aspect of its use is of minimal significance."'" The
court's discussion of the nature of the copyrighted work was brief but pregnant with
significance. After citing Harper& Row andNew Era for their restrictive approach
to fair use of unpublished works, Judge Legge succinctly noted that, although this
factor favored the plaintiff Norse in the instant case, Congress in its recent
amendment to § 107 "explicitly provided that the fair use defense may apply to
unpublished work if the fair use finding is made upon consideration of all four
factors."'1 7
The rhetorical structure of Judge Legge's analysis of the second factor-citation
of prior case law; brief, subordinated mention of the plaintiff's prevailing on this
factor; pointed recitation of the language of the 1992 amendment-indicated the
presence of a fresh judicial perspective on a test that had become so routine in the
courts as to be nearly ritualized. Although Judge Legge's manifest message was that
the letters' unpublished nature favored the plaintiff, the organization of the passage
strongly hinted that the virtual per se rule must be re-examined in the light of the new
statutory language. Even though copied expression is unpublished, the passage
seemed to say, the second factor should not be allowed to foreclose the possibility of
fair use. In the same spirit, the Norse II court concluded that "[t]he public will
benefit" from Morgan's biography,' 8 and accordingly granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's infringement claim. '
Another significant contribution to the growing body of post-amendment case
law is a cluster of decisions involving Internet copying of the unpublished works of
L. Ron Hubbard. Since New Era, the Church of Scientology and its copyright
holders have aggressively opposed the copying of Hubbard's works by a variety of
users, including journalists and disaffected Church members., As in New Era, the
plaintiff in these actions-Religious Technology Center ("RTC")-held a license to
Hubbard's copyrights. The alleged primary infringers were former members of the
Church who posted Hubbard's writings on the Internet for the purposes of discussion
and criticism. The convergence of cyberspace technology and copyright law has
given these cases a special contemporary relevance, for the role of the fair use
doctrine in Internet copying and the paradox of "unpublished" works that may be
accessed electronically throughout the world at the stroke of a key are questions

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Norse v. Henry Holt and Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 144-45 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Norse I).
See id.at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
See id.at 148.
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which copyright jurisprudence has just begun to address. "0
In Religious Technology Centerv. Netcom On-Line CommunicationServices,

Inc., ' RTC and another Church-affiliated organization brought an infringement
action against Dennis Erlich, a former Scientology minister turned critic of the
Church, who had posted Hubbard's published and unpublished works to an Internet
discussion group. In considering RTC's motion for a preliminary injunction, Judge
Whyte examined the likelihood of Erlich's prevailing on a fair use defense and

concluded that, while the second factor (nature of the copyrighted work) weighed in
Erlich's favor where Hubbard's published works were concerned, the factor favored
RTC with respect to the unpublished writings." 2
As with the Norse II opinion, however, the Netcom court's language indicated
a change of judicial attitude towards the virtual per se rule. After citing the

"narrower scope" language of Harper&Row, Judge Whyte noted, by way of dictum,
that the courts in Wright and Norse II had found fair use where portions of
unpublished letters were copied by biographers, and went on to state that Congress

had amended § 107 "to clarify that the unpublished nature of a work should not itself
bar a finding of fair use."'" Although Judge Whyte concluded that, on balance,

Erlich should be enjoined from further unauthorized copying of Hubbard's
works-except insofar as such copying might accord with fair use' '4 -his discussion
of fair use of unpublished works reprised the rhetorical structure of Judge Legge's

analysis in Norse II, similarly implying that a revisionary approach to the virtual per
se rule was in order.
In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma ("Lerma F,),' '5 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia availed itself of the same rhetorical pattern
in denying RTC's motion to enjoin the Washington Post from copying Hubbard's
writings." 6 Named as a co-defendant in an action brought against Arnaldo

Lerma-another disaffected Church member who had transmitted Church documents
over the Internet-the Post had obtained its copies of the same documents from a
public court file in California and published minimal excerpts in a newspaper

110. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUFENBERGTO HECEEST7ALJUKEBOX 197-236

(1994) (discussing digital technologies and their implications for copyright law).
I 11. 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
112. See id. at 1245-46. In a connected case, the same court denied RTC's motion for a preliminary injunction
against the computer bulletin board service and Intemet access provider which Dennis Erlich had used to disseminate
Churchdocuments. SeeReligiousTech. Ctr.v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,1383
(N.D. Cal. 1995). In a similar action, a Colorado federal court denied RTC's motion for a preliminary injunction
against a non-profit archive and bulletin board service run by former Scientologists, noting the likely success of a fair
use defense and the potential harm to the public interest. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp.
1519, 1526-27 (D. Colo. 1995).
113. Netcom, 923 F. Supp. at 1245.
114. Seeid.at1258.

115. 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Va. 1995).
116. See id. at 267. In a connected case, the same court denied RTC's motion for summary judgment in its
infringement action against the Washington Post and two of its reporters, calling RTC's motivation in filing the suit
"reprehensible" and awarding attorney's fees to thedefendants. See ReligiousTech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362,
1367-68 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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article" 7 Defining fair use as "designed to balance the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder with the public's interest in dissemination of information,"' 8 Judge
Brinkema found that "[t]he balance of harms is heavily tilted towards the
defendants"" 9 and denied RTC's motion for a preliminary injunction. Once again,
as in Norse 11 and Netcom, the court acknowledged the "narrower scope" rule of
Harper&Row, then proceeded to distinguish that case and its "scooping" facts from
the Post'smore typical newsgathering activities, and concluded with a recitation of
the 1992 amendment to § 107.120 Employing a phrase that fair use advocates had
perhaps despaired of encountering in a post-Salingeropinion, Judge Brinkema noted
that the unpublished nature of the Church's documents "plays a minimal role in this
Court's consideration."1 21
That the new judicial trend will not insulate every defendant from the
consequences of unauthorized copying of unpublished works is strikingly illustrated
by Religious Technology Center v. Lerma ("Lerma I/'), 122 in which RTC
successfully moved for summary judgment against Arnaldo Lerma and was awarded
statutory damages.'23 Unlike the WashingtonPost in Lerma I, decided a year earlier,
Lerma had transmitted substantial quantities of Church documents through
cyberspace for reasons that the court deemed to be "non-neutral and nonscholarly."' 24 With respect to the unpublished nature of the documents, Judge
Brinkema invoked the restrictive language of Harper& Row, Salinger,and New Era
in finding against Lerma, and conspicuously omitted any mention of the 1992
amendment to § 107.' 25 As the two faces of Judge Brinkema show, Harper&Row
and its progeny are very much alive and well when it comes to a defendant whose
actions and motives deviate from the modest, judicious copying typically engaged in
by scholars and news reporters.
V. CONCLUSION: A MIXED FORECAST FOR SCHOLARS

The winter of discontent for scholars, biographers, and historians, though by no
means assuredly over, has become less harsh since 1992. A new series of precedents
has emerged to moderate the chill of Harper & Row and its progeny. Far-flung,
tentative, factually diverse though they may be, the decisions beginning with Wright
and continuing through Norse I and II, Netcom, and Lerma I have responded to the
threat of a virtual per se rule banning fair use of unpublished works.
The watershed event, clearly, was the passage of the 1992 amendment to § 107
of the 1976 Act. The amendment's goal of restoring to judicial decision-making the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Lerma 1,897 F. Supp. at 262.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 264.
Id.
No.CIV.A.95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *1 (E.D. Va.Oct.4,1996).

at *13-*16.
123. See id.
124. Id. at *6.
at *7-*8.
125. See id.
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time-honored flexibility of the equitable doctrine of fair use has been realized in the
Norse and Lerma opinions. Scholars may take heart in Wright and Norse I in
particular, for the facts in those cases are typical of the vast majority of serious
projects: modest quotation of unpublished materials that have been made available
through a research library. The seeming paradox of a copyright owner's refusing
permission to quote from publicly accessible documents-sometimes from documents
that she herself has sold to the library-is, of course, an inevitable consequence of
copyright law's severance of intangible rights from physical property rights,'26 but
it is a paradox made more tolerable by the availability of the fair use privilege and by
prudent judicial application of the doctrine.
The twofold social function of the fair use doctrine, referred to at the outset of
this comment, takes on a special relevance in the new judicial climate. The line of
cases beginning with Wright bids fair to vitalize the second, specifically legal purpose
of the doctrine: its operation as an affirmative defense to a claim of infringement. Its
initial purpose, however, is the prelegal, indeed supralegal one of fostering a climate
of mutual tolerance and understanding among authors, heirs, scholars, and other
members of the copyright ecosystem. The progress of science and useful arts depends
vitally on the robust participation of the members of this ecosystem as well as on their
ability to exercise self-restraint. Righteous self-assertion and negative capability
must work together to achieve a delicate balance.
In the ideal ecosystem, original expression would retain its character of private
property yet lose some of its aura of exclusivity in the dynamic process of
socialization. Such a process might be thought of as the sociology of copyright: the
collective practices that make up the institution of creating, owning, and using
original expression. The much-discussed question of whether, ultimately, there can
be such a thing as original expression'27 is beyond the scope of this comment, but it
might be suggested in passing that the transformative character of fair use is really
a feature of all creativity, and that original expression is therefore a fiction in two
*senses. The individual talent is inconceivable apart from an enabling tradition. As
T.S. Eliot remarked: "Someone said: 'The dead writers are remote from us because
we know so much more than they did.' Precisely, and they are that which we

126. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). The paradox is particularly striking in Wright, where the quotations whose
publication the plaintiff, Richard Wright's widow, sought to enjoin were from letters that she herself previously sold
to Yale's Beinecke Library-a research institution open to the public. See PATRY, supra note 8, at 99.
127. In copyright law, "originality" does not, strictly speaking, refer to artistic creativity or genius, but merely to the
requirement that protectible expression actually have originatedwith the author-that is, that the author did not copy
the expression from another source. See I NIMMER, supra note 4 § 2.01 [A], at 2-9. Yet even this neutral sense of
originality, which presupposes an individual generating his or her own forms of expression, has been challenged by

literary theorists and critics, particularly in the context of Romantic literature. One recent trend in theory argues that
authorial identity and originality are illusory constructs, and that original expression is in reality a text woven from
conscious and unconscious influences and borrowings-that is, that original works are always in some sense copies.
See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE/MusicITEXT 146 (1977); HAROLD BLOOM, THE
ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973); PAUL DE MAN, THE RHETORIC OF ROMANTICISM (1984); JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITINo
ANDDIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans. 1978). For discussions of copyright in relation to notions of Romantic genius, see
Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar,Thief.FairUse and UnpublishedWorks, 9 CARDOZOARIS & ENT. LJ. 15,2022 (1990); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:Economic and Legal Conditionsof the Emergence
of the 'Author', 17 EIOMEENTH-CENTUY STUD. 425 (1984).
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know."' 2 8 Although such a claim is anathema to the essentially Romantic myth of

sovereign selfhood that sustains our faith in original expression, it is concretely
arguable that, far from being a mere exception to genuine creativity, transformative
use is the unacknowledged condition of allexpression. Fair use-and foul-has been

central to the operation of the creative spirit. Or, to use terms more typical of
copyright jurisprudence, the creator/user dichotomy begins to dissolve when it is
recalled that creators are inevitably users.

In order to achieve its supralegal purpose of fostering a lively sense of the
interdependence of owners and users, the fair use doctrine requires the cooperation

of publishers and editors no less than that of other members of the copyright
ecosystem. At a time when authors' estates are more than ever jealous of their

privacy and revenues, and are taking an increasingly active role in asserting those
rights, scholars stand in need of more than the legal protections of the fair use
doctrine: they also require the good-faith assistance of their publishers and editors.

Alluding to the heightened vigilance of literary estates, Judge Leval has aptly noted
that "[a] ban on fair use of unpublished documents establishes a new despotic
potentate in the politics of intellectual life-the 'widow censor."" 29
All too often, university presses3 require their authors to seek detailed

permissions for quotations-published as well as unpublished-that by any
reasonable calculus fall within the privilege of fair use. Frequently, a press will insist
on permissions only after putting the author's manuscript through the lengthy process

of evaluation, at which point the author, faced with Hobson's choice of beginning the
entire process over with a new publisher who may be equally cautious, usually

submits to the demands of the copyright owner. If the copyright owner requests a
substantial fee, the university press, anticipating only a modest profit on the scholar's
monograph, typically declines to share the cost of permissions. Many scholarly
presses and journals subscribe to guidelines which arbitrarily fix the quantities and

kinds of quotation that will qualify as "fair use."''
As long as academic presses and journals remain a weak link in the fair use
chain, the progress of science and useful arts will suffer. The "keepers of the flame,"
132

as Ian Hamilton has styled hostile and obstructive estates like those of James Joyce

128. T.S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent (1919), reprinted in SELECTED PROSE OFT.S. ELIOT 38,40
(Frank Kermode ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975).
129. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra note 12, at 1118.
130. Several of the cases discussed in this comment-Harper &Row, Salinger, New Era, and Wright-involved
trade publishers, not university presses, but the latter are in many respects even more central to the concerns of scholars
and to their fair use needs. University presses publish the bulk of serious scholarly work in the United States and
routinely encounter the demands of literary estates and copyright owners.
131. See Christopher Scarles, Quote and Be Blessed, in TEXTUAL MONOPOLIES: LITERARY COPYRIGHT AND THE
PuBLIcDOMAIN 133-37 (Patrick Parrinder and Warren Chemaik eds., 1997) (discussing arbitrary quotation guidelines
adopted by publishers despite the doctrine of "fair dealing," the British counterpart of fair use).
132. See IAN HAMILTON, KEEPERS OFTHE FLAME_: LrTERARY ESTATES ANDTHE RISE OF BIOGRAPHY 267-90 (1992)
(discussing the history of the Estate ofJames Joyce); see also BRUCEARNOLD, THESCANDALOFULYSSES 64-86 (199 1)
(giving an account of the copyrights in Joyce's works and the role of the Joyce Estate since Joyce's death). In recent
years, the Joyce Estate under the direction ofJoyce's grandson, Stephen James Joyce, has taken a particularly scornful
and obstructive stance towards scholars, considering them to be insulting to the memory of James Joyce and invasive
of the Joyce family's privacy. For a sampling of the disputes that have arisen between the Joyce Estate and Joyce
scholars, see StephenJoyce, Letterto theeditor, 30 JAMESJOYCEQ. 345,345-49 (1993); James F. Clarity, JamesJoyce
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and Richard Wright, are emboldened by needless and unsolicited capitulations on the
part of publishers.' 33 (Of course, where an author has likely exceeded fair use, she
should expect to seek permissions.) The recent advances in judicial attitudes towards
statutory fair use, along with the courts' increasingly flexible application of the
statute's language, will remain incomplete until publishers become correspondingly
more enlightened and flexible in their dealings with scholars and estates. The dual
role of the fair use doctrine in
Anglo-American copyright jurisprudence requires this larger collaboration of
forces for the full realization of culture. Where the creative wealth of nations is at
stake, fair use is much more than a legal doctrine: It is a principle of wise husbandry
and an agent of progress. When it functions vigorously, we grow as a society; when
it atrophies, we are the poorer.
Robert Spoo

PapersGo on Public Display Forthe First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at B3; and Caryn James, Joyce Family
Letters in LiteraryDebate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1988, at B13. See also Patrick Parrinder, Licensing Scholarship:
Some Encounterswith the Wells Estate, in TEXTuALMONOPOLIES, supranote 13 1, at 57-67 (discussing the difficulties
experienced by one scholar with the H.G. Wells Estate, in the context of British "fair dealing").
133. As Editor-in-Chief of the JamesJoyce Quarterly,published at the University of Tulsa, I have experienced the
hostility of the James Joyce Estate at first hand. The Estate's open contempt for most Joyce scholars and its routine
denial of permissions would make my work and that of the contributors to the journal impossible were it not for
vigorous exercise of the fair use privilege.
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